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It is well known that no quantum bit commitment protocol is unconditionally secure.
Nonetheless, there can be non-trivial upper bounds on both Bob’s probability of correctly
estimating Alice’s commitment and Alice’s probability of successfully unveiling whatever
bit she desires. In this paper, we seek to determine these bounds for generalizations of
the BB84 bit commitment protocol. In such protocols, an honest Alice commits to
a bit by randomly choosing a state from a specified set and submitting this to Bob,
and later unveils the bit to Bob by announcing the chosen state, at which point Bob
measures the projector onto the state. Bob’s optimal cheating strategy can be easily
deduced from well known results in the theory of quantum state estimation. We show
how to understand Alice’s most general cheating strategy, (which involves her submitting
to Bob one half of an entangled state) in terms of a theorem of Hughston, Jozsa and
Wootters. We also show how the problem of optimizing Alice’s cheating strategy for a
fixed submitted state can be mapped onto a problem of state estimation. Finally, using
the Bloch ball representation of qubit states, we identify the optimal coherent attack
for a class of protocols that can be implemented with just a single qubit. These results
provide a tight upper bound on Alice’s probability of successfully unveiling whatever bit
she desires in the protocol proposed by Aharonov et al., and lead us to identify a qubit
protocol with even greater security.
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1. Introduction
Suppose Alice and Bob wish to play a game wherein Alice wins if she can correctly predict
which of two mutually exclusive events will occur and Bob wins if she cannot. One way to
play the game would be for Alice to tell Bob her prediction before the events in question.
There are situations, however, where this is inappropriate. For instance, Bob might be able
to influence the relative probability of the events in question (indeed, which of these events
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occurs might be entirely up to Bob). In such cases, Alice wants Bob to know as little as
possible about her prediction until some time after the occurrence of one of the events. Of
course, Bob will still want to receive some sort of ‘token’ of Alice’s prediction prior to the
events in question, since otherwise Alice could always claim to have won the game. Thus,
Alice and Bob would like a cryptographic protocol which forces Alice to ‘commit’ herself to a
bit (which encodes her prediction), while ensuring that Bob can find out as little as possible
about this bit until the time that Alice reveals it to him. This is a bit commitment(BC)
protocol. In addition to the task of prediction described above, BC appears as a primitive in
many other cryptographic tasks and is therefore of particular significance in cryptography.
A simple example of an implementation of BC proceeds as follows. Alice writes a ‘0’ or
a ‘1’ on a piece of paper, and locks this in a safe. She then sends the safe to Bob, but keeps
the key. When it comes time to reveal her commitment, she sends the key to Bob, who opens
the safe and discovers the value of the bit. This protocol binds Alice to the bit she chose at
the outset since she cannot change what is written on the piece of paper after she submits
the safe to Bob. However, it only conceals the bit from Bob if he is unable to pick the lock,
or force the safe open, or image the contents of the safe.
This paper focuses on a particular class of quantum BC protocols, specifically, general-
izations of the BC protocol that was published by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [1]. We
shall refer to these as generalized BB84 BC protocols. Within such protocols, an honest Alice
commits to a bit 0 by choosing a state randomly from a specified set of states, and by subse-
quently sending a system prepared in this state to Bob. She commits to a bit 1 by choosing
the state from a different set. At the end of the protocol she reveals to Bob which state she
submitted and Bob measures the projector onto this state to verify Alice’s claim.
Bob can cheat in such a protocol by performing a measurement on the systems submitted
to him by Alice, prior to Alice revealing her commitment. The measurement that maximizes
his probability of correctly estimating Alice’s commitment can be determined from the well-
known theory of state estimation [2].
Alice can cheat by preparing the system she initially submits to Bob in a state different
from the ones specified by the protocol, in particular, by entangling this system with an
ancilla system that she keeps in her possession, and by later performing a measurement on
the ancilla and choosing the state which she announces to Bob based on the outcome of this
measurement. This has been called a coherent attack, since in general such an attack requires
Alice to maintain the coherence between the different possibilities in the random choice the
protocol asks her to make. It has also been called an EPR-type attack, since in the original
BB84 BC protocol, the optimal entangled state for Alice to prepare is the EPR state. The
problem of determining the coherent attack that maximizes Alice’s probability of successfully
cheating has remained open to date. It is the goal of this paper to begin to answer this
question.
It has been shown by Mayers [3] and by Lo and Chau [4] that an unconditionally secure
BC protocol does not exist [5]. In other words, it is not possible to devise a BC protocol
that is arbitrarily concealing, that is, one for which Bob’s probability of correctly estimating
Alice’s commitment is arbitrarily small, and arbitrarily binding, that is, one for which Alice’s
probability of revealing whatever bit she desires without being caught cheating is arbitrarily
small. Nonetheless, there remain interesting questions to be answered about coherent attacks.
R.W. Spekkens and T. Rudolph 3
For instance, it is possible to have a BC protocol that is partially binding and partially
concealing, wherein Alice and Bob’s probabilities of successfully cheating are both bounded
above [8]. Determining the optimal coherent attack is crucial to determining the degree of
bindingness that can be achieved in such protocols.
Coherent attacks are also important in other quantum cryptographic tasks between mis-
trustful parties - such as coin tossing [9], cheat sensitive bit commitment [10], bit escrow [11]
and quantum gambling [12] - wherein a type of bit commitment often appears as a subpro-
tocol. Understanding how to optimize coherent attacks is therefore important for settling
questions about the degree of security that can be achieved for such tasks.
We summarize here the main results of the paper. The last four apply only to protocols
that can be implemented using a single qubit.
• We explain coherent attacks in terms of the well known theorem of Hughston, Jozsa
and Wootters [13].
• We demonstrate that the problem of finding the optimal coherent attack for a fixed
submitted state can be mapped onto a problem of state estimation which has a known
solution [2].
• We show that the optimal state for a cheating Alice to submit has a support in the span
of the supports of the set of states from which an honest Alice chooses.
• We provide a simple geometrical picture on the Bloch sphere of coherent attacks. In
addition to being useful for building one’s intuitions about such attacks, this provides
a convenient formalism within which to solve the optimization problem, as well as a
geometrical criterion for whether or not Alice can cheat with probability 1 in a given
protocol.
• We find analytic expressions for the optimal cheating strategy in the case where the sets
of states that an honest Alice chooses from each have no more than two elements.
• Using these results, we determine Alice’s optimal coherent attack in a BC protocol
that was proposed by Aharonov et al. [11]. Our result provides a tight upper bound
on Alice’s probability of unveiling whatever bit she desires, improving upon the best
previous known upper bound. This allows us to determine, for this protocol, the trade-
off relation between a measure of the concealment and a measure of the bindingness.
We show that the same trade-off relation can be achieved with several other protocols.
• Finally, our results allow us to determine Alice’s optimal coherent attack in a novel
generalized BB84 BC protocol wherein the trade-off relation between concealment and
bindingness is better than can be achieved with the protocol of Aharonov et al.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide an operational definition of bit
commitment, define degrees of security, and describe the BB84 BC protocol and its generaliza-
tions. In section 3, we introduce the notion of a convex decomposition of a density operator,
review its properties, and demonstrate its significance for coherent attacks. In section 4, we
formulate the optimization problem to be solved. Results for protocols involving systems of
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arbitrary dimensionality and for protocols involving qubits are presented in sections 5 and 6
respectively. Applications of these results are presented in section 7, and section 8 contains
our concluding remarks.
2. Bit Commitment
2.1. An operational definition of Bit Commitment
We begin by providing a definition of BC that is strictly operational, that is, one which only
makes reference to the experimental operations carried out by the parties, and not to any
concepts that are particular to a physical theory. This seems to us to be the most sensible way
of proceeding for any information processing task, since such tasks can be defined indepen-
dently of their physical implementation and consequently of any physical theory describing
this implementation. Among other benefits, this approach allows one to characterize a phys-
ical theory by the type of protocols which can be securely implemented within a universe
described by that theory.
A BC protocol is a cryptographic protocol between two mistrustful parties. It can be de-
fined in terms of the characteristics of these parties’ honest (i.e., non-cheating) strategies. We
call the two parties Alice and Bob, and assume that Alice is the one making the commitment.
The protocol is divided into three intervals, called the commitment phase, the holding
phase and the unveiling phase. Each of these may involve many rounds of communication
between Alice and Bob. The result of the protocol is one of three possibilities, denoted
‘0’, ‘1’ and ‘fail’. Which of these has occurred is determined from the outcomes of all the
measurements that an honest Bob has made throughout the protocol. The protocol specifies
the strategy an honest Alice must adopt to commit to a bit b. It is such that if both parties are
honest and Alice follows the strategy for committing a bit 0(1), the result of the protocol is
necessarily ‘0’(‘1’). It follows that if the outcome ‘fail’ occurs, an honest Bob can conclude that
Alice must have cheated. The protocol must also be such that if both parties are honest, Alice
does not, through actions taken after the end of the commitment phase, change the relative
probability of the results ‘0’ and ‘1’ occurring, and Bob does not, prior to the beginning of
the unveiling phase, gain any information about Alice’s commitment.
In the protocols we shall be considering, Alice will not always be caught when she cheats.
Thus, it can happen that the result of the protocol is ‘b’ even though Alice cheated and did
not follow the honest strategy for committing a bit b. Indeed, Alice can, by cheating, change
the relative probability of the ‘0’ and ‘1’ results by actions taken after the commitment phase.
We shall say that ‘Alice unveils bit b’ whenever the result of the protocol is ‘b.’a
2.2. Types of security
To define the security of a BC protocol, one needs to quantify the notions of concealment
against Bob and bindingness against Alice. In this paper, we focus upon the probability that
Bob can, prior to the beginning of the unveiling phase, correctly estimate Alice’s commit-
ment (given that Alice is honest), and the probability that Alice can, after the end of the
†a It is important to remember that within our terminology ‘Alice unveiling bit b’ implies that she was not
caught cheating. Thus in a generalized BB84 BC protocol, when Alice announces b to Bob, we say that Alice
is attempting to unveil a bit b, but we only say that she has unveiled b if she passes Bob’s test.
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commitment phase, successfully unveil whatever bit she desires (given that Bob is honest).
We denote these by PE and PU respectively. Note that these probabilities vary with the
cheating strategy used. In this paper, we shall only consider protocols wherein these are both
equal to 1/2 for honest strategies.b
A bit commitment protocol is said to be arbitrarily binding if for all of Alice’s strategies, PU
is bounded above by 1/2+ε, where ε can be made arbitrarily small by increasing some security
parameter in the protocol. It is said to be arbitrarily concealing if for all of Bob’s strategies,
PE is bounded similarly. Although no BC protocol can be arbitrarily binding and arbitrarily
concealing, both PE and PU can have non-trivial upper bounds (that is, upper bounds less
than 1). We will refer to such protocols as partially binding and partially concealing. The
maxima of PE and PU for a given protocol, which we denote by P
max
E and P
max
U , quantify the
degree of concealment and the degree of bindingness that can be achieved in this protocol.
The implementation of BC using a safe, discussed in the introduction, is binding against
Alice, but is only concealing against Bob if he has limited ‘safe-cracking’ resources. More
useful implementations of bit commitment instead rely for concealment on the assumption
that Bob has limited computational resources. Obviously, one would prefer that the security
of the protocol not depend on the resources of either party, but rather only on the laws of
physics and the integrity of the party’s laboratories. A property of a protocol that has this
feature is said to hold unconditionally. All the properties of protocols referred to in this paper,
are properties which hold unconditionally.
2.3. The BB84 BC protocol
The first proposal for a quantum mechanical implementation of a BC protocol was made by
Bennett and Brassard [1]. We refer to it as the BB84 BC protocol. This was recognized by
its authors to have no bindingness against Alice. Nonetheless, we begin by reviewing this
protocol, since it provides a simple example of the type of cheating strategy with which this
paper will be concerned.
Imagine a protocol wherein Alice submits a qubit to Bob during the commitment phase.
To commit to a bit 0, she prepares the qubit in a state chosen uniformly from the set {|0〉 , |1〉},
while to commit to a bit 1, she chooses from the set {|+〉 , |−〉} , where |±〉 ≡ (|0〉 ± |1〉) /√2.
No measurement Bob can do is able to distinguish these two possibilities. At the unveiling
phase, Alice can tell Bob which state she submitted, and Bob can do a measurement of
the projector onto this state to verify her honesty. If Alice tries to convince Bob that she
submitted a state drawn from the opposite set - for instance, that she submitted |+〉 when
in fact she submitted |0〉 - then her probability of passing his test is only 1/2. The BB84 BC
protocol demands that Alice repeat her commitment for N qubits, that is, that Alice either
chooses each qubit’s state uniformly from {|0〉 , |1〉} or uniformly from {|+〉 , |−〉}. Clearly, in
this case her probability of passing Bob’s test when she lies about her commitment is 1/2N .
†bIn most discussions of bit commitment, it is assumed that neither Alice nor Bob has any information at the
commitment phase about which bit will be more beneficial for Alice to unveil. However, one must relax this
assumption in order to consider a game wherein Alice predicts which of two events will occur given some prior
information on their relative probability. The results of this paper can be generalized in a straightforward
manner to apply to such a protocol. It suffices to replace Eq. (5) with PU = p0PU0 + p1PU1, where pb is the
probability that Alice will wish to unveil bit b after the commitment phase, and to generalize all subsequent
expressions accordingly.
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So, with respect to strategies wherein Alice cheats by lying about her commitment, such a
protocol appears to be arbitrarily binding.
However, Alice has another cheating strategy available to her. Prior to submitting a
qubit to Bob, she can entangle it with a qubit that she keeps in her possession. Specifically,
she prepares the two in the EPR state (|0〉 |1〉 − |1〉 |0〉) /√2. Given that this state can also
be written as (|+〉 |−〉 − |−〉 |+〉) /√2, it is clear that by measuring the {|0〉 , |1〉} basis or
{|+〉 , |−〉} basis on the qubit in her possession, she projects the qubit in Bob’s possession
into the {|0〉 , |1〉} basis or {|+〉 , |−〉} basis respectively. Moreover, the binary outcome of her
measurement will be perfectly anti-correlated with the state of Bob’s qubit. So Alice knows
precisely which state to announce to Bob. Using this strategy, she can choose which bit she
wants to unveil just prior to the unveiling phase, and always succeed at passing Bob’s test.
This is the so-called ‘coherent’ or ‘EPR’ attack.
The analysis thus far leaves open the possibility that some other protocol using quantum
primitives might succeed where the BB84 protocol failed. In fact, it has been shown that
for the most general nonrelativistic protocol, unconditional security is not possible [3, 4, 9].
Nonetheless, there exist simple generalizations of the BB84 protocol that are both partially
concealing and partially binding.
2.4. Generalizations of the BB84 BC protocol
A generalized BB84 BC protocol defines two sets of states
{
ψ0k
}n0
k=1
and
{
ψ1k
}n1
k=1
and corre-
sponding probability distributions
{
p0k
}n0
k=1
and
{
p1k
}n1
k=1
(note that the values of n0 and n1
need not be the same). In order to commit to bit b, an honest Alice chooses a state from
{ψbk}nbk=1 using the distribution
{
pbk
}nb
k=1
and sends a system prepared in this state to Bob at
the commitment phase. An honest Bob simply stores the system during the holding phase.
At the unveiling phase, an honest Alice announces b and k to Bob, and he measures the pro-
jector onto
∣∣ψbk〉 . If Alice passes Bob’s test, she has succeeded in unveiling the bit b, and the
result of the protocol is ‘b’. Otherwise, she is caught cheating, and the result of the protocol
is ‘fail’.c
To estimate Alice’s commitment, Bob must estimate whether the system in his possession
is described by ρ0 =
∑n0
k=1 p
0
k
∣∣ψ0k〉 〈ψ0k∣∣ , or ρ1 =∑n1k=1 p1k ∣∣ψ1k〉 〈ψ1k∣∣ . The problem of optimal
state estimation has previously been studied in great detail [2], and in particular the optimal
measurement for discriminating two density operators is well known [14]. Using the optimal
measurement, the maximum probability of Bob correctly estimating Alice’s commitment is
PmaxE =
1
2
+
1
4
Tr |ρ0 − ρ1| , (1)
where |A| =
√
A†A. It follows that as long as ρ0 and ρ1 do not have orthogonal supports,
PmaxE is strictly less than 1 and the protocol is partially concealing.
The complementary problem, of determining PmaxU , the maximum probability of Alice
unveiling whatever bit she desires, and the strategy which achieves this maximum, has re-
†c It should be noted that the honest strategy for Alice to commit b that we have described is equivalent
with respect to concealment to the following strategy: Alice couples the system she sends to Bob with a
system she keeps in her possession (of dimension nb or greater) such that the two are in the entangled state∑nb
k=1(p
b
k)
1/2 |k〉 ⊗ ∣∣ψbk〉 , where the |k〉 form an orthonormal basis. At the unveiling phase, she measures the
basis |k〉 in order to determine what integer to announce to Bob.
R.W. Spekkens and T. Rudolph 7
mained open to date. Alice’s most general strategy is of the following form. Prior to sending
the system to Bob, she entangles it with a system she keeps in her possession. At the unveil-
ing phase, she does one of two measurements on the system in her possession, depending on
whether she is attempting to unveil a 0 or a 1. She chooses what integer k to announce to
Bob based on the outcome of this measurement. It follows that in order to determine PmaxU ,
we must optimize over the entangled state that Alice prepares, the two measurements she can
perform and the announcement she makes to Bob given each possible outcome. We shall see
that there exist generalized BB84 BC protocols where PmaxU is strictly less than 1, so that
these protocols are partially binding.
It will be useful to introduce a few mathematical concepts and results before turning to
the optimization problem.
3. Convex decompositions of a density operator
3.1. Definition and properties of convex decompositions
We begin by introducing a mathematical concept that will be critical for solving our problem.
A convex decomposition {(qk, σk)}nk=1 of a density operator ρ is a set of probabilities, qk, and
distinct density operators, σk, such that
ρ =
n∑
k=1
qkσk.
The σk will be referred to as the elements of the convex decomposition. We use the term
‘convex’ to distinguish this from a decomposition of a pure state into a sum of pure states,
and from a decomposition of a density operator into general sums of operators, that is, sums
of operators that are not necessarily positive. Nonetheless, we will throughout this paper use
the term decomposition as a shorthand.d
Some terminology will be used in connection with convex decompositions. The elements
that receive non-zero probability will be called the positively-weighted elements. A decompo-
sition will be called extremal if its positively-weighted elements are all of rank 1 (i.e., if they
are all pure states). A set of density operators will be called uncontractable if none of its
members can be written as a convex decomposition of the others. A convex decomposition
will be called uncontractable if its positively-weighted elements are uncontractable. Clearly,
all extremal decompositions are uncontractable. Finally, a decomposition of ρ is trivial if its
only positively-weighted element is ρ.
Another concept that will be useful in the present investigation is a relation that holds
between sets of density operators, and which we shall refer to as composable coincidence. Two
sets of density operators {σ0k} and {σ1k} will be called composably coincident if there exist
probability distributions
{
q0k
}
and
{
q1k
}
such that
∑
k
q0kσ
0
k =
∑
k
q1kσ
1
k.
†d Note that previous authors have used the term ρ-ensemble to refer to a convex decomposition of ρ.
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In other words, {σ0k} and {σ1k} are composably coincident if there exists a density operator
which has a convex decomposition in terms of the σ0k’s and a convex decomposition in terms
of the σ1k’s.
It will also be useful to set forth a few well-known facts about convex decompositions [13].
A necessary and sufficient condition for a density operator σ to appear in some convex decom-
position of ρ is for the eigenvectors of σ to be confined to the support of ρ. The cardinality of
an extremal decomposition of ρ must be greater than or equal to the rank of ρ. Finally, there
sometimes exists a prescription for obtaining the probability with which a particular element
appears in a convex decomposition of a density operator. In convex decompositions of ρ con-
taining orthogonal elements, the probability associated with an element σ is fixed by ρ and
σ – it is simply Tr(σρ)/Tr
(
σ2
)
. However, for a general set of non-orthogonal elements {σk}
that form a convex decomposition of ρ, the probabilities need not be unique; the same set of
density operators {σk} may appear in different convex decompositions of ρ. For instance, the
completely mixed state in a 2d Hilbert space, I/2, has an indenumerably infinite number of
convex decompositions with elements {|0〉 〈0| , |1〉 〈1| , |+〉 〈+| , |−〉 〈−|}, since these yield a de-
composition for every probability distribution of the form
(
1
2λ,
1
2λ,
1
2 (1− λ), 12 (1− λ)
)
where
λ lies between 0 and 1. Nonetheless, a special case wherein the probabilities are unique is if
the convex decomposition is extremal and of cardinality equal to the rank of ρ. In this case, a
simple formula for the probability of a given element can be given. If {(qk, |ξk〉 〈ξk|)} is such
a decomposition, then the non-zero probabilities are given by Jaynes’ rule [15],
qk =
1
〈ξk| ρ−1 |ξk〉 , (2)
where ρ−1 is the inverse of the restriction of ρ to its support (in other words, ρ−1 is obtained
from ρ by inverting the non-zero eigenvalues in the spectral resolution of ρ).
3.2. The connection between convex decompositions and POVMs
The most general measurement on a system in quantum mechanics is associated with a positive
operator-valued measure(POVM). A POVM is a set of positive operators that sum to the
identity operator, that is, a set {Ek} such that for every k, 〈φ|Ek |φ〉 ≥ 0 for all |φ〉 ∈ H, and∑
k Ek = I. Neumark’s theorem [16] shows that every POVM on a system can be implemented
by coupling to an ancilla system and performing projective measurements on the ancilla. As
it turns out, there is a close mathematical connection between convex decompositions of ρ
and POVMs, as was demonstrated by Hughston, Jozsa and Wootters [13].
Lemma There is a one-to-one map between the convex decompositions of ρ and the
POVMs over the support of ρ. Specifically, the POVM {Ek}nk=1 is associated with
the decomposition {(qk, σk)}nk=1 defined by
qkσk =
√
ρEk
√
ρ. (3)
Proof. It is trivial to see that {(qk, σk)}nk=1 is a decomposition of ρ by summing Eq. 3
over k and using the fact that
∑
k Ek = I, where I is the identity operator on the support of
ρ. That any decomposition of ρ is associated with some POVM over the support of ρ follows
from the fact that
√
ρ is invertible on the support of ρ. Specifically, if this inverse is denoted
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by ρ−1/2 then the resolution {(qk, σk)}nk=1 is associated with the POVM {Ek}nk=1 defined by
Ek = qkρ
−1/2σkρ−1/2. ✷
We say that the POVM {Ek}nk=1 generates the convex decomposition {(qk, σk)}nk=1. Note
that we do not treat the technicalities associated with decompositions of infinite cardinality
in this paper, however a discussion of these can be found in Cassinelli et al. [17].
3.3. The significance of convex decompositions to coherent attacks
Suppose Alice and Bob share an entangled state for which ρ is the reduced operator on Bob’s
system. Prior to any measurements, the best Alice can do in predicting the outcomes of Bob’s
measurements is to use the density operator ρ in the Born rule. However, by virtue of the
correlations between her system and Bob’s, if she performs a measurement and takes note of
the outcome, her ability to predict the outcomes of Bob’s measurements will increase. Since
all of the information that is relevant to Alice predicting the outcomes of Bob’s measure-
ments is encoded in a density operator, it follows that when she learns the outcome of her
measurement, she should update the density operator with which she describes Bob’s system.
Suppose that the kth outcome occurs with relative frequency qk, and leads Alice to update
the density operator with which she describes Bob’s system to σk. We say that the statistics
of possible updates of Alice’s description of Bob’s system are given by {(qk, σk)} , that is, a
set of probabilities and density operators.
As it turns out, the possibilities for these statistics are given by the convex decompositions
of ρ. Specifically, we have:
HJW Theorem For every measurement Alice can perform, the statistics of possible up-
dates of her description is given by some convex decomposition of ρ, and for every convex
decomposition of ρ, there exists some measurement for which the statistics of possible
updates is given by that decomposition.
This was first demonstrated for extremal convex decompositions by Hughston, Jozsa and
Wootters [13], and it is straightforward to generalize the proof to arbitrary convex decompo-
sitions. Since this theorem is the key to coherent attacks, we present the generalized proof
here.
Proof. Suppose Alice and Bob share a state |ψ〉 that is a purification of ρ (a normalized
vector in HA ⊗HB satisfying TrA (|ψ〉 〈ψ|) = ρ). If the non-zero eigenvalues of ρ are denoted
by λj , and {|ej〉} is a set of normalized eigenvectors associated with these eigenvalues, then
|ψ〉 can always be written as
|ψ〉 =
∑
j
√
λj |fj〉 ⊗ |ej〉 ,
where {|fj〉} is a set of orthonormal vectors for Alice’s system. This way of writing |ψ〉 is
known as the bi-orthogonal or Schmidt decomposition.
We begin by specifying the measurement that Alice must do on her system in order to
have her statistics of possible updates given by the convex decomposition {(qk, σk)} of ρ. If
the POVM on Bob’s system that generates this decomposition is denoted by {Ek}, so that
Eq. (3) holds, and U is the unitary map that satisfies
|fj〉 = U |ej〉 ,
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then the required measurement on Alice’s system is the one associated with the POVM
{UETk U †}nk=1, where ETk denotes the transpose of Ek with respect to the basis of eigenvectors
of ρ (note that this POVM need only be defined over the support of TrB (|ψ〉 〈ψ|)). The proof
is as follows.
The entangled state Alice and Bob share can be written in terms of U as
|ψ〉 =
∑
j
√
λjU |ej〉 ⊗ |ej〉 .
Upon measuring the POVM {UETk U †} on her system and obtaining outcome k, the projection
postulate for POVMs dictates that Alice should describe Bob’s system by the unnormalized
state
TrA
(√
UETk U
† |ψ〉 〈ψ|
√
UETk U
†
)
=
(∑
j
√
λj |ej〉 〈ej|
)
Ek
(∑
j′
√
λj′ |ej′〉 〈ej′ |
)
=
√
ρEk
√
ρ
= qkσk.
So after this measurement, with probability qk Alice updates the density operator with which
she describes Bob’s system to σk.
It is also easy to show that the statistics of possible updates are given by some convex
decomposition of ρ for every measurement Alice can do. This follows from the fact that every
POVM can be written in the form {UETk U †} for some choice of {Ek} given a particular U. ✷
When Alice entangles the system she submits to Bob with a system she keeps in her
possession in such a way that Bob’s reduced density operator is ρ, we shall say that Alice
submits ρ to Bob. When Alice performs a measurement that leads to her statistics of possible
updates being given by the convex decomposition {(qk, σk)} of ρ, we shall say that Alice
realizes this decomposition on Bob’s system.
4. The nature of the optimization problem
In section 2.4, we formulated the problem of determining the optimal cheat strategy for
Alice as a variational problem over the entangled state that she initially prepares and the
measurements she performs on her half of the system. However, from the results of section 3.3
it is clear that in determining Alice’s probability of unveiling the bit of her choosing, all that
is important about the entangled state she prepares is the reduced density operator ρ she
submits to Bob, and all that is important about the measurement she performs is the convex
decomposition of ρ that she thereby realizes. It suffices therefore to vary over ρ and its convex
decompositions.
We begin by showing that if Alice is attempting to unveil a bit b then it suffices for her to
realize a convex decomposition with a number of elements less than or equal to nb. The proof
is as follows. Suppose Alice realizes a convex decomposition {(q˜j , σ˜j)}n
′
j=1 with a number of
elements n′ that is greater than nb. She still must announce to Bob an index between 1 and
nb, so that the elements of this decomposition must be grouped into nb sets, where elements in
the kth set, Sk, correspond to announcing the index k to Bob. When Alice announces index
k, Bob will measure the projector
∣∣ψbk〉 〈ψbk∣∣ and obtain a positive result with probability
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∑
j∈Sk q˜j
〈
ψbk
∣∣ σ˜j ∣∣ψbk〉 . However, there is always an nb-element convex decomposition that
yields the same probability of a positive result as the one considered here; specifically, the
decomposition {(qk, σk)}nbk=1 with qkσk =
∑
j∈Sk q˜j σ˜j .
The probability of Alice succeeding at unveiling the bit b given that she submits ρ and
realizes an nb-element convex decomposition {(qk, σk)}nbk=1 of ρ is
PUb =
nb∑
k=1
qk
〈
ψbk
∣∣ σk ∣∣ψbk〉 . (4)
Thus, if Alice submits ρ and realizes the convex decompositions
{(
q0k, σ
0
k
)}n0
k=1
and
{(
q1k, σ
1
k
)}n1
k=1
to unveil bit values of 0 and 1 respectively, then if she is equally likely to wish to unveil 0 as
1 (as we are assuming in this paper), her probability of unveiling the bit of her choosing is
PU =
1
2
PU0 +
1
2
PU1
=
1
2
1∑
b=0
nb∑
k=1
qbk
〈
ψbk
∣∣ σbk ∣∣ψbk〉 . (5)
The task is to maximize PU with respect to variations in ρ,
{(
q0k, σ
0
k
)}n0
k=1
and
{(
q1k, σ
1
k
)}n0
k=1
subject to the constraint that ρ =
∑n0
k=1 q
0
kσ
0
k =
∑n1
k=1 q
1
kσ
1
k.
It is useful to divide this optimization problem into two steps. In the first step one
determines, for an arbitrary but fixed ρ, the nb-element convex decomposition of ρ that
maximizes the probability PUb of Alice unveiling the bit b. Given this solution, the probability
PU of Alice unveiling the bit of her choosing can be expressed entirely in terms of the submitted
ρ. In the second step one determines the ρ that maximizes PU .
5. Results for general protocols
5.1. The connection to state estimation
We will show that the problem of optimizing the choice of convex decomposition for an
arbitrary but fixed density operator has an intimate connection to the problem of optimal
state estimation. As discussed in section 3.2, for every convex decomposition {(qk, σk)} there
exists a POVM {Ek} , defined over the support of ρ, that generates this decomposition as in
Eq. (3). Thus, Eq. (4) can be written as
PUb =
nb∑
k=1
〈
ψbk
∣∣√ρEk√ρ ∣∣ψbk〉 .
A set of normalized states {χbk} and probabilities {wbk} can be defined in terms of ρ and {ψbk}
as follows:
∣∣χbk〉 =
√
ρ
∣∣ψbk〉√〈
ψbk
∣∣ ρ ∣∣ψbk〉 , (6)
wbk =
〈
ψbk
∣∣ ρ ∣∣ψbk〉∑
k
〈
ψbk
∣∣ ρ ∣∣ψbk〉 . (7)
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In terms of these, PUb has the form
PUb = C
nb∑
k=1
wbk
〈
χbk
∣∣Ek ∣∣χbk〉 ,
where C =
∑
k
〈
ψbk
∣∣ ρ ∣∣ψbk〉 .
We now recall [2] the problem of estimating the state of a system that is known to have
been prepared in one of nb states {χbk} with prior probabilities {wbk}. The most general type
of measurement is a POVM measurement, and it suffices to consider POVMs that have nb
elements (this is established by an argument exactly analogous to the one provided above for
the sufficiency of nb-element decompositions in optmizing over coherent attacks). For a mea-
surement of the POVM {Ek}, the probability of estimating correctly is
∑nb
k=1 w
b
k
〈
χbk
∣∣Ek ∣∣χbk〉 .
The connection between our problem and the state estimation problem is now clear. If
{χbk} and {wbk} are defined by Eqs. (6) and (7), and {Ek} is defined by (3), then the following
relation holds. The probability of unveiling a bit b, associated with a set of states
{
ψbk
}
,
when Bob’s reduced density operator is ρ, given that Alice’s strategy consists of realizing an
nb-element convex decomposition {(qk, σk)} of ρ, is a constant multiple of the probability of
correctly estimating the state of a system, known to be prepared in one of nb states {χbk}
with prior probabilities {wbk}, given a measurement of the POVM {Ek}.
So, if one has the solution to the problem of finding the POVM that maximizes the
probability of correctly estimating the state of a system from among a set of pure states, then
one also has the solution to the problem of finding the convex decomposition of ρ that Alice
should realize to maximize her probability of passing Bob’s test. There is a duality between
these two information theoretic tasks.
This result is very useful since it connects a task about which very little is known to one
about which a great deal is known. In particular, one is able to infer some general features of
the optimal cheat strategy by appealing to some well-known theorems on state estimation.
One such feature is that if the
{
ψbk
}
are linearly independent, and the support of ρ is the
span of the
{
ψbk
}
, then the optimal convex decomposition of ρ is an extremal decomposition.
The proof is as follows. If the
{
ψbk
}
are linearly independent and span the support of ρ, then
the
{
χbk
}
are linearly independent. It is well known that in estimating a state drawn from a
set of linearly independent states, the optimal POVM has elements of rank 1 [2]. The convex
decomposition that is associated with such a POVM has elements that are pure states, i.e.,
it is extremal.
5.2. The support of the optimal density operator
We now turn to the problem of determining the optimal density operator for Alice to submit
to Bob. We begin by showing that although Alice could cheat by submitting a system with
more degrees of freedom than the honest protocol specifies, she gains no advantage by doing
so. In other words, the optimal ρ has a support that is equal to or a subspace of the span of{
ψ0k
}n0
k=1
∪ {ψ1k}n1k=1 . We establish this by showing that for any ρ∗ that has support strictly
greater than this span, there is a ρ that has support that is equal to or a subspace of this
span and that yields a greater value of PU . Suppose the optimal convex decomposition of ρ
∗
for unveiling bit b is denoted
{(
qb∗k , σ
b∗
k
)}nb
k=1
. The maximum probability of Alice unveiling
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the bit of her choosing using ρ∗ is then
PmaxU (ρ
∗) =
1
2
1∑
b=0
nb∑
k=1
〈
ψbk
∣∣ qb∗k σb∗k ∣∣ψbk〉 .
However, if Alice submits the density operator
ρ = Gρ∗G/Tr (ρ∗G) ,
where G is the projector onto the span of
{
ψ0k
}n0
k=1
∪ {ψ1k}n1k=1 , and realizes the convex
decomposition
{(
qbk, σ
b
k
)}nb
k=1
defined by qbkσ
b
k = Gq
b∗
k σ
b∗
k G/Tr (ρ
∗G) , then her probability of
unveiling whatever bit she desires is
PU (ρ) = P
max
U (ρ
∗) /Tr (ρ∗G) .
Since Tr (ρ∗G) < 1, it follows that PU (ρ) > PmaxU (ρ
∗) .
5.3. Conditions for unveiling with certainty
Finally, we consider the question of whether, for a particular protocol, Alice can unveil the bit
of her choosing with certainty. The necessary and sufficient condition for there to be a strategy
that makes PUb = 1 for a given b, is that ρ is decomposed by the set of states
{
ψbk
}nb
k=1
, that
is, there must exist a probability distribution
{
qbk
}nb
k=1
such that
{(
qbk,
∣∣ψbk〉 〈ψbk∣∣)}nbk=1 forms
a convex decomposition of ρ. The necessary and sufficient condition for there to be a strategy
that makes PU = 1 is that there exists a ρ that is decomposed by both
{
ψ0k
}n0
k=1
and
{
ψ1k
}n1
k=1
.
In the terminology of section 3.1,
{
ψ0k
}n0
k=1
and
{
ψ1k
}n1
k=1
must be composably coincident.
The results described in this section constitute all that we shall say about the optimal
cheat strategy for an arbitrary protocol. For the rest of this paper, we shall restrict ourselves
to the special case of sets
{
ψ0k
}n0
k=1
and
{
ψ1k
}n1
k=1
whose union span at most a two dimensional
Hilbert space, that is, protocols that can be implemented using a single qubit.
6. Results for qubit protocols
6.1. The Bloch ball representation
Our optimization problem is greatly simplified in the case of a 2D Hilbert space since there
is a one-to-one mapping between the set of all density operators in such a space and the set
of all points within the unit ball of R3. For clarity, we begin by reminding the reader about
the details of this mapping.
If one defines an inner product between operators A and B by Tr
(
A†B
)
, the set of oper-
ators over a Hilbert space forms an inner product space. In a 2d Hilbert space, a particularly
convenient orthogonal basis for the set of operators is the set of Pauli operators {σx, σy , σz, I},
with matrix representations in the {|0〉 , |1〉} basis of
σx =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, σy =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
, σz =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
, I =
(
1 0
0 1
)
. (8)
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Any operator A can therefore be written as A = 12 (a0I + ~a · ~σ) where ~σ=(σx, σy, σz) and
~a = (ax, ay, az) , with a0, ax, ay, az ∈ C1. In particular, for a density operator ρ, the constraints
of unit trace (Tr(ρ) = 1) and positivity (det (ρ) ≥ 0) imply that
ρ =
1
2
(I + ~r · ~σ) ,
where ~r ∈ R3 and |~r| ≤ 1.
Thus we see that every density operator is represented by a vector ~r within the unit ball of
R3, which we shall refer to as the Bloch ball.e
Density operators describing pure states are characterized by a vanishing determinant
which corresponds to a vector of unit length, |~r| = 1, which we shall sometimes denote by rˆ.
Thus, pure states are represented by the points on the surface of the ball. The completely
mixed state, ρ = 12I, is represented by ~r =
~0, which is the point at the centre of the ball.
If two density operators ρ1 and ρ2 are represented by vectors ~r1 and ~r2, the inner product
between ρ1 and ρ2 is given by Tr (ρ1ρ2) =
1
2 (1 + ~r1 · ~r2) . It follows that orthogonal states are
represented by antipodal points, since Tr(ρ1ρ2) = 0 implies ~r1 · ~r2 = −1.
We are now in a position to obtain a representation on the Bloch ball of all the density
operators that can be formed by convex combination of a particular set of elements {σk}nk=1 ,
that is, all the ρ that have the form
ρ =
n∑
k=1
qkσk
for some probability distribution {qk}nk=1. Since the set of density operators that can be
formed by an arbitrary set of elements {σk}nk=1 is the same as the set that can be formed by
an uncontractable set of elements from which all the states in {σk}nk=1 can be built up by
convex combination, it suffices to consider only uncontractable sets of elements.
Denoting the Bloch vectors associated with ρ and σk by ~r and ~sk respectively, it is easy
to see that the relevant set is given by
~r =
n∑
k=1
qk~sk, where 0 ≤ qk ≤ 1,
n∑
k=1
qk = 1.
To understand what this manifold of points looks like, consider the simplest case of n = 2.
The above equation can then be written as
~r = ~s1 + λ (~s2 − ~s1) , where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
This is simply the parametric equation for a segment of a straight line extending between ~s1
and ~s2. Similarly, in the case of n = 3, we have
~r = ~s1 + λ (~s2 − ~s1) + ξ (~s3 − ~s2) ,
where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ ξ ≤ λ. Since σ1, σ2 and σ3 were assumed to form an uncontractable
set of elements, ~s1, ~s2 and ~s3 cannot lie on a line, and therefore define the vertices of a triangle.
†eThe surface of the ball is usually referred to as the Bloch sphere or the Riemann sphere in the context of
spins, and the Poincare sphere in the context of photon polarization.
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The above equation is the parametric equation for the surface of points inside this triangle.
For n = 4, we have
~r = ~s1 + λ (~s2 − ~s1) + ξ (~s3 − ~s2) + ζ (~s4 − ~s3) ,
where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ ξ ≤ λ and 0 ≤ ζ ≤ ξ. Again, since σ1, σ2, σ3 and σ4 were assumed to
form an uncontractable set of elements, none of ~s1, ~s2, ~s3 or ~s4 can lie along the line segment
defined by any other two, nor inside the surface of the triangle defined by any other three, and
thus these vectors define the vertices of either a convex quadrilateral or a tetrahedron. The
above equation is the parametric equation for the surface of points inside this quadrilateral,
or the volume of points inside this tetrahedron. Similarly, for greater than 4 uncontractable
elements, we obtain the parametric equation for the points inside an n-vertex convex polygon
or convex polyhedron. All told, in the case of a set of n uncontractable elements, the set of
density operators that can be composed from these will be represented by the region inside
an n-vertex convex polytope. A few different sets of states and the density operators that can
be composed from them are depicted in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. A depiction of three sets of states containing 2, 3 and 4 elements respectively. The points
in the Bloch ball representing these states are indicated by small black spheres. The manifolds
inside the line segment, triangle and tetrahedron that are defined by each set of points represent
all the density operators that can be composed with each set of states.
It is now easy to see the solution to a complementary problem, namely, how to obtain a
representation on the Bloch ball of all the uncontractable convex decompositions of a particu-
lar density operator ρ. If ρ is represented by the point ~r, then every n-element uncontractable
convex decomposition of ρ is represented by an n-vertex convex polytope which contains ~r.
For instance, every 2-element uncontractable convex decomposition of ρ is represented by a
line segment that contains ~r; every 3-element uncontractable convex decomposition of ρ is
represented by a triangle that contains ~r, and so forth. In Fig. 2, we illustrate a few of the
convex decompositions of a fixed density operator.
Of particular interest to us in the present context are extremal convex decompositions
of a density operator ρ (which are always uncontractable). Since pure states are associated
with unit Bloch vectors, the convex polytopes associated with such decompositions have their
vertices on the surface of the Bloch ball. Fig. 2 provides an example of this distinction.
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Fig. 2. An illustration of three convex decompositions of a fixed density operator, two of which
are 2-element decompositions, and one of which is a 3-element decomposition. The point in the
Bloch ball representing the density operator is indicated with a large black sphere. Each convex
decomposition is represented by a polytope containing the point representing the density operator,
the vertices of which represent the elements of the decomposition. These are indicated in grey.
The longer of the two line segments, which has its vertices on the surface of the Bloch ball, is an
example of an extremal convex decomposition.
6.2. The conditions under which Alice can unveil the bit of her choosing with
certainty
In section 5.3 it was pointed out that a strategy with PUb = 1 exists if and only if ρ is
decomposed by the states
{
ψbk
}
. The Bloch ball representation gives a simple way of testing
whether this condition is satisfied for protocols restricted to a 2D Hilbert space. It suffices to
plot the convex polytope whose vertices are the points representing the
{
ψbk
}
and to determine
whether the point representing ρ is contained in this polytope or not. If it is, then Alice can
unveil bit b with certainty. If it is not, then she cannot. An example of the two possibilities
is provided in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. A depiction of a fixed density operator and two sets of states, the lower of which
decomposes the density operator and the uppermost of which does not.
More importantly, we can now answer the question of whether there exists a strategy for
Alice with PU = 1 for protocols restricted to a 2D Hilbert space. As pointed out in section 5.3
this only occurs if the two sets of states are composably coincident. It is clear now how to
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verify whether this is the case or not. Simply plot the convex polytopes associated with both
sets of states, and determine whether they intersect one another or not. If they do, then any
point inside the region of intersection corresponds to a density operator that is decomposed
by both sets and consequently lets Alice unveil the bit of her choosing with probability 1. If
they do not, then this probability is strictly less than 1.
The convex polytopes associated with the sets of states used in the BB84 BC protocol
are depicted in Fig. 4. Since these cross at the origin, it follows that if Alice submits to Bob
the completely mixed state, she can achieve PU = 1. So we simply have a restatement of the
fact that if Alice initially prepares a maximally entangled state, such as the EPR state, and
submits half to Bob, then she can achieve PU = 1. The protocols we shall consider in the
rest of this paper are associated with non-intersecting convex polytopes. See Figs. 6-10 for
examples.
Fig. 4. The Bloch ball representation of the BB84 BC protocol. Since the polytopes representing
the sets of states defined by the protocol intersect, Alice can submit the density operator associated
with their intersection to make her probability of unveiling whatever bit she desires equal to unity.
6.3. Optimizing over the convex decompositions of an arbitrary but fixed density
operator
We now turn to the problem of determining the optimal EPR cheating strategy for a qubit
protocol. We do not solve this problem completely; rather, we solve it under the further
restriction that each set contains only linearly independent states. In the present 2D context,
linear independence implies that each set can have no more than two elements.
As discussed in section 4, it is useful to split the problem into two parts involving op-
timization over convex decompositions of an arbitrary but fixed density operator, followed
by optimization over density operators. We address these two parts of the problem in this
section and the next section respectively.
We begin with the problem of maximizing the probability, PUb, that Alice can unveil the
bit b given that she submitted a density operator ρ. This maximum must be found with respect
to variations in the convex decomposition of ρ that she realizes. The optimal decomposition
will depend on ρ and the states in the set
{
ψbk
}
. In order to simplify the notation in this
section, we drop the index b from
∣∣ψbk〉 and nb. We also assume that ρ is impure, since
otherwise there is no optimization problem to be solved.
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6.3.1. A set containing one element (n = 1)
In this case, Bob’s test is fixed (he always measures the projector onto |ψ1〉), so the
probability of passing this test depends only on ρ and not on the convex decomposition of ρ
that Alice realizes. Thus, there is no optimization over decompositions to be performed in
this case.
6.3.2. A set containing two elements (n = 2)
Let the Bloch vectors associated with |ψk〉 and ρ be denoted by aˆk and ~r respectively,
and let those associated with the elements, σk, of the two-element convex decomposition
{(qk, σk)}2k=1 that Alice realizes be denoted by ~sk. In terms of these, Alice’s probability of
passing Bob’s test, specified by Eq. (4), has the following form
PUb =
1
2
(
1 +
2∑
k=1
qk (aˆk · ~sk)
)
. (9)
We must maximize this subject to the constraint that ~r =
∑
k qk~sk.
We find that the optimal convex decomposition of ~r is given by
~s opt1 = ~r + L+ (~r) dˆ,
~s opt2 = ~r + L− (~r) dˆ, (10)
and
qoptk =
1
2
1− |~r|2
1− ~r · ~s optk
(11)
where
L± (~r) = −~r · dˆ±
√
1− |~r|2 +
(
~r · dˆ
)2
, (12)
and
dˆ =
aˆ1 − aˆ2
|aˆ1 − aˆ2| . (13)
Note that
∣∣~s opt1 ∣∣ = ∣∣~s opt2 ∣∣ = 1, which means that this is an extremal convex decomposition.
The proof of optimality is presented in Appendix A.
This solution has a very simple geometrical description. It is the convex decomposition
that is represented by the chord (line segment whose endpoints lie on the surface of the ball)
that contains ~r and that is parallel to the chord defined by aˆ1, aˆ2. An example is presented
in Fig. 5.
The corresponding probability of passing Bob’s test is simply
PmaxUb =
1
2
(
1 +
(
~r + L+ (~r) dˆ
)
· aˆ1
)
.
In Hilbert space language,
PmaxUb =
1
2
(〈ψ1|ρ|ψ1〉+ 〈ψ2|ρ|ψ2〉)
+
√
2 (1− Tr(ρ2)) |〈ψ1|ψ2〉|2 + (〈ψ1|ρ|ψ1〉 − 〈ψ2|ρ|ψ2〉)2.
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Fig. 5. An illustration of the optimal convex decomposition for Alice to realize when she has
submitted to Bob a fixed density operator(indicated by the large black sphere) and is attempting
to convince him that he has one of two states (indicated by the small black spheres). This is
represented by the chord(indicated in grey) that is parallel to the chord defined by the two states.
After Alice realizes this decomposition (by making a measurement on the system that is entangled
with Bob’s), she updates her description of Bob’s system to whichever of the elements it happened
to be collapsed to(indicated by the grey spheres). When it comes time for Alice to announce to
Bob which of the two states he should test for to verify her honesty, she announces the state which
has the smallest angular separation from the element of the decomposition onto which she has
collapsed his system.
6.4. Optimizing over density operators
We now consider the problem of determining the optimal density operator for Alice to submit
to Bob in order to maximize her probability of unveiling the bit of her choosing. The solution
will depend on the values of n0 and n1. Given that we are assuming that the states in the sets{
ψ0k
}n0
k=1
and
{
ψ1k
}n1
k=1
are linearly independent, there are only three possibilities to address:
both sets contain two elements; one set contains two elements and the other contains one
element; both sets contain one element. We shall consider each of these in turn.
6.4.1. Both sets contain two elements (n0 = n1 = 2)
Denote the Bloch vector associated with the state
∣∣ψbk〉 by aˆbk. The result of the previous
section indicates that whatever the optimal ~r is, the optimal convex decomposition for un-
veiling bit b is represented by the chord passing through ~r parallel to the chord defined by
aˆb1, aˆ
b
2. We therefore have that Alice’s probability of unveiling the bit of her choosing given
an arbitrary ~r and given that when she attempts to unveil the bit b she realizes the convex
decomposition of ~r that is optimal for doing so, is simply
PU =
1∑
b=0
1
4
(
1 +
(
~r + Lb+ (~r) dˆb
)
· aˆb1
)
, (14)
where dˆb =
aˆb1−aˆb2
|aˆb1−aˆb2| and
Lb+ (~r) = −~r · dˆb +
√
1− |~r|2 +
(
~r · dˆb
)2
.
It will be convenient to adopt the convention that the states in the protocol are indexed
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in such a way that
〈
ψ01 |ψ11
〉
= maxk,k′
〈
ψ0k|ψ1k′
〉
. In terms of the Bloch ball, the convention
states that if one draws the chords defined by aˆ01, aˆ
0
2 and aˆ
1
1, aˆ
1
2, the endpoints aˆ
0
1 and aˆ
1
1 have
the smallest separation.
We consider two cases.
Case 1: The chords defined by aˆ01, aˆ
0
2 and aˆ
1
1, aˆ
1
2 are parallel.
In this case dˆ0 = dˆ1 and there are a family of optimal ~r’s satisfying the parametric equation
~r opt =
aˆ01 + aˆ
1
1
|aˆ01 + aˆ11|
+ λdˆ0, for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 2 aˆ
0
1 + aˆ
1
1
|aˆ01 + aˆ11|
· dˆ0. (15)
This family corresponds to the points on the chord of the Bloch ball that is parallel to the
chord defined by aˆ01, aˆ
0
2 (or aˆ
1
1, aˆ
1
2) and that passes through the point on the surface of the ball
that is equidistant between aˆ01 and aˆ
1
1. This is illustrated in Fig. 7.
Case 2: The chords defined by aˆ01, aˆ
0
2 and aˆ
1
1, aˆ
1
2 are not parallel.
In this case, the optimal ~r is unique and is given by
~r opt =
{
~r max if |~r max| ≤ 1
aˆ01+aˆ
1
1
|aˆ01+aˆ11| otherwise
, (16)
where
~r max = xmax0 dˆ
⊥
1 + x
max
1 dˆ
⊥
0 + x
max
2 nˆ. (17)
Here
xmax0 =
1
γ1
aˆ11 · dˆ⊥1
√
1− (xmax2 )2,
xmax1 =
1
γ0
aˆ01 · dˆ⊥0
√
1− (xmax2 )2,
xmax2 =
(
aˆ01 + aˆ
1
1
) · nˆ√
((aˆ01 + aˆ
1
1) · nˆ)2 + (γ0 + γ1)2
, (18)
where γb =
√
1− (aˆb1 · nˆ)2 and where
nˆ = dˆ0 × dˆ1,
dˆ⊥b = dˆb × nˆ,
dˆb =
aˆb1 − aˆb2∣∣aˆb1 − aˆb2∣∣ . (19)
Thus, the solution has one of two forms depending on whether the condition |~r max| ≤ 1
holds or not. If it does not hold, then ~r opt =
(
aˆ01 + aˆ
1
1
)
/
∣∣aˆ01 + aˆ11∣∣ , which is simply the point
on the surface of the Bloch ball that is equidistant between aˆ01 and aˆ
1
1 along the geodesic which
connects them (recall that in our labelling convention aˆ01 and aˆ
1
1 are the closest endpoints of
the chords defined by aˆ01, aˆ
0
2 and aˆ
1
1, aˆ
1
2). Fig. 6 provides an example of a BC protocol where
this is the case. If the condition |~r max| ≤ 1 does hold, then ~r opt = ~rmax. We will not attempt
to provide a geometrical description of this point in the general case, however Figs. 4 and 9
provide simple examples of BC protocols where |~r max| ≤ 1.
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Fig. 6. A BC protocol where the two sets of states are represented by chords that lie in a plane,
but which do not intersect inside the Bloch ball. The optimal density operator is represented
by the point that lies equidistant between the two closest chord endpoints on the geodesic which
connects them.
In situations having a high degree of symmetry, one can easily deduce some of the features
of ~r opt. We present a few such cases.
Case 2.1: If the chord defined by aˆ01 and aˆ
0
2 and the chord defined by aˆ
1
1 and aˆ
1
2 lie in a
plane, then ~r max is the point of intersection of the lines containing these chords. If this point
falls inside the Bloch ball (|~r max| ≤ 1), then it represents the optimal density operator. This
confirms the results of section 5.3. The BB84 BC protocol, illustrated in Fig. 4, is an instance
of such a case. If the point of intersection falls outside the Bloch ball (|~r max| > 1), then the
optimal density operator is as described above. The BC protocol that is illustrated in Fig. 6
is an instance of such a case.
Case 2.2: If the chord defined by aˆ01 and aˆ
0
2 and the chord defined by aˆ
1
1 and aˆ
1
2 both
pass through the nˆ axis, then ~r opt lies along this axis.
Case 2.3: If the chord defined by aˆ01 and aˆ
0
2 and the chord defined by aˆ
1
1 and aˆ
1
2 are
parallel to, equidistant from, and on either side of the equatorial plane perpendicular to nˆ,
then ~r opt lies in that plane.
If the conditions of cases 2.2 and 2.3 both hold, then ~r opt lies at the centre of the Bloch
ball. This corresponds to Alice submitting the completely mixed state. An example of such
a protocol is provided in Fig. 9. Although in the example of this figure the two chords point
in orthogonal directions, this is not necessary, it is only necessary that they not be parallel.
The proofs of the results of this section are presented in Appendix B.
6.4.2. One set contains one element and one set contains two elements (n0 = 1, n1 = 2)
We now assume that one of the sets
{
ψ0k
}n0
k=1
and
{
ψ1k
}n1
k=1
has only a single element while
the other has two. Without loss of generality we may assume that the single element set is
the b = 0 set, and we denote its unique element by
∣∣ψ0〉 . So in order to unveil a bit value of
1 Alice can announce either k = 1 or k = 2 and must then pass Bob’s test for
∣∣ψ1k〉 , while to
unveil a bit value of 0 Alice has no choice but to pass a test for the state
∣∣ψ0〉 .
We first consider the case where
〈
ψ0|ψ11
〉
=
〈
ψ0|ψ12
〉
. This corresponds to case 1 of sec-
tion 6.4.1 in the limit that aˆ01 and aˆ
0
2 converge to a single point aˆ
0 representing
∣∣ψ0〉 . There
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is a family of optimal solutions of the form
~r opt =
aˆ0 + aˆ11
|aˆ0 + aˆ11|
+ λdˆ1, for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 2.
This family corresponds to the points on the chord of the Bloch ball that is parallel to the
chord defined by aˆ11, aˆ
1
2 and that passes through the point on the surface of the ball that is
equidistant between aˆ0 and aˆ11. The BC protocol illustrated in Fig. 10 is an example of this
case. The case
〈
ψ0|ψ11
〉 6= 〈ψ0|ψ12〉 corresponds to case 2 of section 6.4.1 in the limit that aˆ01
and aˆ02 converge to the point aˆ
0. In this limit, we find that |~r max| > 1. Consequently,
~r opt =
aˆ0 + aˆ11
|aˆ0 + aˆ11|
.
6.4.3. Both sets contain one element (n0 = 1, n1 = 1)
We now assume there is only a single element in both of the sets, and denote each of these
states by
∣∣ψb〉 . Thus to unveil a bit value of b Alice must pass Bob’s test for ∣∣ψb〉 . Consider
first the possibility that
∣∣ψ0〉 and ∣∣ψ1〉 are orthogonal. In this case, no matter what ρ Alice
submits, her probability of unveiling either bit is strictly 1/2.
When
∣∣ψ0〉 and ∣∣ψ1〉 are not orthogonal, the situation corresponds to case 2 of section 6.4.1,
in the limit that aˆb1 and aˆ
b
2 converge to a single point aˆ
b for both values of b. In this limit we
again find |~r max| > 1. Consequently,
~r opt =
aˆ0 + aˆ1
|aˆ0 + aˆ1| .
An example is presented in Fig. 8.
Fig. 7. An illustration of a BC protocol of the form proposed by Aharonov et al. [11]. The two
sets of states are given by Eq. (20) with θ = pi/8. There is a family of optimal density operators
lying along the chord indicated in grey.
7. Applications of the results
These results can be applied to the generalized BB84 BC protocol proposed by Aharonov et
al. [11]. The protocol is defined by the following states, from which an honest Alice chooses
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uniformly
∣∣ψ01〉 = |θ〉 , ∣∣ψ02〉 = |−θ〉 ,∣∣ψ11〉 = |π/2− θ〉 , ∣∣ψ12〉 = |π/2 + θ〉 , (20)
where |θ〉 = cos θ |0〉 + sin θ |1〉 and θ is some fixed angle satisfying 0 < θ ≤ π4 . The sets of
states associated with bits 0 and 1 describe parallel chords on the Bloch ball, as depicted in
Fig. 7. We therefore have an instance of case 1 of section 6.4.1. It follows that an optimal
strategy for Alice is to simply submit |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) and tell Bob to test for ∣∣ψb1〉, where
b is the bit she wishes to unveil. Another is to submit |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉) and to tell Bob
to test for
∣∣ψb2〉 . So Alice does not need to make use of entanglement in this case. The most
general optimal strategy is for Alice to submit ρ = w |+〉 〈+| + (1 − w) |−〉 〈−| , realize the
convex decomposition {(w, |+〉 〈+|) , ((1− w), |−〉 〈−|)} , and tell Bob to test for
∣∣ψb1〉 (∣∣ψb2〉)
upon obtaining the outcome |+〉 (|−〉) . Alice’s maximum probability of unveiling whatever
bit she desires is
PmaxU =
1
2
(1 + sin 2θ) .
Previously, the best known upper bound on this probability was
PU ≤ 1
2
(
1 +
1
cos2 2θ
(√
1 + 2 cos2 2θ − 1
))
,
as can be inferred from the results in section 5 of Ref. [11]. In the case of θ = π/8, we find
PmaxU =
1
2 +
1
2
√
2
≃ . 85355, while the previous best bound was PU ≤
√
8−1
2 ≃ .91421.
We can now compare this with Bob’s maximal probability of estimating Alice’s com-
mitment correctly. If Alice follows the honest protocol for committing a bit b, she chooses
uniformly between
∣∣ψb1〉 and ∣∣ψb2〉 and submits a system in this state. Bob must therefore
discriminate between density operators ρ0 and ρ1 defined by ρb =
1
2
∑2
k=1
∣∣ψbk〉 〈ψbk∣∣ . His
maximum probability of doing so is given by Eq. (1), in this case,
PmaxE =
1
2
(1 + cos 2θ) .
It is worth noting that the quantity 12Tr|ρ0 − ρ1| appearing in Eq. (1) is simply half the
Euclidean distance between the points in the Bloch ball representing ρ0 and ρ1.
¿From the above expression for PmaxU and P
max
E , we can conclude that there is a trade-off
between these quantities of the form
(PmaxU − 1/2)2 + (PmaxE − 1/2)2 = 1/4. (21)
At θ = 0, PmaxE = 1 and P
max
U = 1/2, so that there is no concealment against Bob, but perfect
bindingness against Alice (since PmaxU = 1/2 for an honest Alice). At θ = π/4, P
max
E = 1/2
and PmaxU = 1, so that the roles of Alice and Bob are reversed. The only choice of θ leading
to a ‘fair’ protocol is θ = π/8. In this case, PmaxE = P
max
U =
1
2 +
1
2
√
2
.
Our results also imply that the same trade-off between PmaxU and P
max
E can be achieved
with the most simple imaginable BC protocol, namely one wherein Alice submits to Bob one
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Fig. 8. An illustration of a BC protocol of the form specified in Eq. (22), with γ = pi/4.
The optimal density operator is indicated by the large black sphere. BC protocols of this form
achieve the same trade-off between concealment and bindingness as those of the form proposed by
Aharonov et al.
of two non-orthogonal states. Specifically, to commit a bit b, an honest Alice sends Bob a
qubit in the state
∣∣ψb〉 , where ∣∣ψ0〉 = |0〉 ,∣∣ψ1〉 = |γ〉 , (22)
where γ is some fixed angle satisfying 0 < γ ≤ π/2. An example of this protocol is illustrated
in Fig. 8. This is an instance where n0 = 1 and n1 = 1, which was considered in section 6.4.3.
One can infer from the results of that section that Alice’s optimal strategy is to submit the
state |γ/2〉 and to announce whatever bit she wishes to unveil. It is straightforward to verify
that this protocol has the same properties as the one described above.
It is easy to understand the equivalence of these protocols geometrically. PmaxU is pro-
portional to the cosine of the angular separation of the endpoints of the polytopes (chords
or points) representing the sets of states an honest Alice chooses from. Meanwhile, PmaxE is
proportional to the Euclidean distance between the midpoints of these polytopes. It is easy
to see from Figs. 7 and 8 that if the endpoints have the same angular separation, then the
midpoints have the same Euclidean separation.
Interestingly, it turns out that any protocol satisfying the conditions of cases 2.2 and 2.3
of section 6.4.1 also yields exactly the same trade-off between PmaxU and P
max
E . Specifically,
one can use any protocol of the form∣∣ψ01〉 = |θ, 0〉 , ∣∣ψ02〉 = |−θ, 0〉 ,∣∣ψ11〉 = |π/2− θ, φ〉 , ∣∣ψ12〉 = |π/2 + θ,−φ〉 , (23)
where |θ, φ〉 = cos θ |0〉 + eiφ sin θ |1〉 and θ and φ are fixed angles satisfying 0 < θ ≤ π4 , 0 <
φ ≤ π/2. Fig. 9 depicts an example of such a protocol. Geometrically, PmaxU is no longer given
by the angle between the endpoints of the two polytopes representing the states an honest
Alice chooses from but rather the angle between the endpoints of these polytopes and the
closest endpoints of the polytopes representing the elements of the convex decomposition that
Alice realizes. This ensures that PmaxU is the same as for the protocols discussed above. The
only difference is that Alice’s optimal strategy in this case requires the use of entanglement.
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Fig. 9. An illustration of a BC protocol of the form specified in Eq. (23), with θ = pi/8 and φ = pi.
The optimal density operator in this case lies at the origin. Depending on which bit Alice desires
to unveil, she realizes the convex decomposition parallel to one or the other of the two chords.
Finally, we consider a protocol wherein there is a single state associated with committing
a bit 0 but two states associated with committing bit 1, specifically,∣∣ψ0〉 = |0〉 ,∣∣ψ11〉 = |α〉 , ∣∣ψ12〉 = |−α〉 , (24)
where α is some fixed angle satisfying 0 < α ≤ π2 . An example of this protocol is provided in
Fig. 10. It is of the form described in section 6.4.2, with
〈
ψ0|ψ11
〉
=
〈
ψ0|ψ12
〉
. From the results
of that section, we can infer that there are a family of optimal coherent attacks of the following
form. Alice submits a density operator of the form ρ = w |α/2〉 〈α/2|+(1−w) |−α/2〉 〈−α/2| .
If she decides to try to unveil bit 1, she realizes the convex decomposition {(w, |α/2〉 〈α/2|) ,
((1− w), |−α/2〉 〈−α/2|)}, and upon obtaining the outcome |α/2〉 (|−α/2〉) tells Bob to test
for |α〉 (|−α〉) . Alice’s maximum probability of unveiling whatever bit she desires in this case
is
PmaxU =
1
2
+
1
2
cosα.
Meanwhile, from Eq. (1), we can infer that Bob’s maximum probability of correctly estimating
Alice’s commitment is
PmaxE =
1
2
+
1
2
sin2 α.
The trade-off between PmaxU and P
max
E is
2
(
PmaxU −
1
2
)2
+
(
PmaxE −
1
2
)
=
1
2
. (25)
A ‘fair’ protocol has PmaxU = P
max
E =
1
2 +
√
5−1
4 ≃ . 80902.
From a comparison of the trade-offs (20) and (25), it is easy to verify that a protocol
which uses the states (24) achieves, for a given bindingness (a given PmaxU ), a concealment
that is greater (and thus a PmaxE that is smaller) than the concealment that can be achieved
in a protocol using the states (20), (22) or (23).
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This point is easy to see geometrically. We compare this last protocol with the protocol
defined by the states (22) for simplicity. From the examples provided in Figs. 8 and 10 it is
easy to visualize the fact that if the endpoints of the polytopes defined by the two protocols
have the same angular separation, the midpoints do not have the same Euclidean separation
– the separation is smaller for a BC protocol defined by the states (24).
An obvious question to ask at this point is whether the trade-off relation of Eq. (25) is
optimal, in the sense that the concealment against Bob is maximized for a given bindingness
against Alice. Elsewhere [8] we show that it is optimal among a certain class of protocols
(which includes the generalized BB84 protocols) that can be implemented using a single qubit.
We also show that a better trade-off can be achieved with a BC protocol that makes use of a
qutrit, that is, a three-level system. The protocol we suggest in Ref. [8] is not a generalized
BB84 BC protocol; however, an equivalent protocol that is of the generalized BB84 form has
been proposed by Ambainis [18].
Fig. 10. An illustration of a BC protocol of the form specified in Eq. (24), with α =
arccos
(
(
√
5− 1)/2
)
. There is a family of optimal density operators lying along the chord in-
dicated in grey. BC protocols of this form achieve a better trade-off between concealment and
bindingness than those of the form proposed by Aharonov et al.
8. Conclusions
We have formulated the problem of optimizing coherent attacks on Generalized BB84 BC
protocols in terms of a theorem of Hughston, Jozsa and Wootters. We have found that there
is a mapping between this problem and one of state estimation. Specifically, we have shown
that the convex decomposition that is optimal for successfully preparing one of a set of states
is related in a simple way to the POVMmeasurement that is optimal for discriminating among
certain transformations of these states.
We have identified Alice’s optimal coherent attack for a class of generalized BB84 BC
protocols that can be implemented using a single qubit. From these results we have determined
the degree of bindingness that can be achieved in the BC protocol proposed by Aharonov et
al., improving upon the best previous upper bound. This enables us to identify the trade-off
between the degree of concealment and the degree of bindingness for this protocol. It has also
led us to identify several qubit protocols that achieve the same trade-off as the proposal of
Aharonov et al. , as well as a qubit protocol that achieves a better trade-off.
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In optimizing over Alice’s strategies, we have relied on the Bloch ball representation of
quantum states. This provides a convenient geometrical picture of a coherent attack. Al-
though this representation can be generalized to higher dimensions [19], it is unlikely that the
geometrical pictures acheivable in this way will be as intuitive. In any event, there remain
many questions to be answered even for qubit protocols, for which this approach is likely to
provide some insight. For instance, one can use it to consider qubit BC protocols that are
not generalizations of the BB84 BC protocol.
In another paper [8], we determine the optimal coherent attack in a class of BC protocols
that is larger than the set of generalized BB84 protocols. However, the problem of determining
the optimal trade-off between concealment and bindingness from among all BC protocols
remains open.
Beyond their relevance to bit commitment, coherent attacks are interesting as an example
of what might be considered a fundamental task in quantum information processing, namely,
the preparation of quantum states at a remote location. One can define many variants of this
task, depending on whether the parties at the two locations are cooperative or adversarial,
and depending on the available resources, such as the number of classical or quantum bits
that can be exchanged, and the amount of prior entanglement the parties share. Bennett et
al. [20] have recently considered remote state preparation in the case of cooperative parties
who share prior entanglement and a classical channel. In the type of remote state preparation
we have considered in this paper, the parties are adversarial and although Alice makes use
of a quantum channel, she does so at a time prior to knowing which state she is supposed to
prepare.
It seems to us that the primitive of remote state preparation, construed in its most general
sense, may be as fundamental as the primitive of state estimation and just as significant for
the purposes of determining what sorts of information processing tasks can be successfully
implemented with quantum systems. The mapping discussed above between state estimation
and the particular type of remote state preparation considered in this paper suggests that
there may be other connections between these two problems. In future work, we hope to
explore this analogy in more detail.
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Appendix A
We here provide the proof of optimality of the convex decomposition specified by Eq. (10).
First, we establish the applicability of Jaynes’ rule, defined in Eq. (2), to the probabilities
in the optimal convex decomposition. This requires showing that the optimal decomposition
is an extremal decomposition with the number of positively-weighted elements equal to the
rank of ρ.
This is trivial to see for a pure ρ. We now demonstrate it for an impure ρ. Because we
have assumed that the {ψk}nk=1 are linearly independent, they span the whole 2D Hilbert
space, and because ρ has rank 2, its support is the 2D Hilbert space. Thus, the {ψk}nk=1 are
linearly independent and have a span that is equal to the support of ρ, which, as shown in
section 5.1 by the mapping to the state estimation problem, is sufficient to establish that the
optimal convex decomposition is an extremal decomposition. It was shown in section 4 that
the number of positively-weighted elements in the optimal convex decomposition is less than
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or equal to n. In the present case, n = 2, so this number must be less than or equal to 2.
However, since ρ is impure, every convex decompositions of ρ has at least 2 elements receiving
non-zero probability. Thus, the number must be precisely 2, which is the rank of ρ.
Jaynes’ rule provides a formula for the probabilities in a convex decomposition of ρ in
terms of ρ and the elements in the decomposition. In terms of Bloch vectors, it has the form
qk =
1
2
1− |~r|2
1− ~r · sˆk ,
where we have written sˆk rather than ~sk since the elements of the optimal decomposition,
being pure, can be represented by unit Bloch vectors. Substituting this expression, together
with the constraint that ~r = q1sˆ1 + q2sˆ2 into Eq. (9), we can write PUb entirely in terms of
sˆ1,
PUb =
1
2
(1 + q1 (aˆ1 · sˆ1) + (aˆ2 · ~r)− q1 (aˆ2 · sˆ1))
=
1
2
(1 + aˆ2 · ~r) + 1
4
(
1− |~r|2
) ((aˆ1 − aˆ2) · sˆ1)
(1− ~r · sˆ1) .
Rather than varying this quantity with respect to sˆ1, we vary with respect to an unnormalized
vector ~s1, taking sˆ1 = ~s1/ |~s1| , where |~s1| =
√
~s1 · ~s1. Setting δPE(sˆ1) = 0 and making use of
the fact that δ |~s1| = δ
√
~s1 · ~s1 = δ~s1 · sˆ1, we find that the optimal sˆ1 satisfies
(1− sˆ1 · ~r) (aˆ1 − aˆ2) + (sˆ1 · (aˆ1 − aˆ2)) (~r − sˆ1) = 0.
By assumption, |~r| 6= 1 (since ρ is impure). It follows that (1− sˆ1 · ~r) 6= 0, and (~r − sˆ1) 6= ~0.
Since it is also the case that (aˆ1 − aˆ2) 6= ~0, we infer that sˆ1 · (aˆ1 − aˆ2) 6= 0. Taking the dot
product of this equation with aˆ1 + aˆ2, we find
(~r − sˆ1) · (aˆ1 + aˆ2) = 0.
Consequently, the solutions that extremize PUb are of the form
sˆext1± = ~r + L± (~r) dˆ,
where dˆ is given in Eq. (13). The constraint
∣∣sˆext1± ∣∣ = 1 implies that L± (~r) have the form
specified in Eq. (12). This result implies that aˆ1 · sˆext1 = aˆ2 · sˆext2 , which allows one to simplify
the expression for PUb provided in Eq. (9). Plugging sˆ
ext
1± into the resulting expression yields
PUb =
1
2
(
1 + aˆ1 · ~r + L± (~r)
(
aˆ1 · dˆ
))
.
Since the coefficient of L± (~r) is positive, and L+ (~r) ≥ L− (~r) , the maximum PUb occurs for
sˆext1+ , while the minimum occurs for sˆ
ext
1− . Thus, the optimal sˆ1 given ~r is
sˆopt1 = ~r + L+ (~r) dˆ.
The constraint ~r =
∑
k qk~sk then implies that
sˆopt2 = ~r + L− (~r) dˆ.
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This establishes what we set out to prove.
Appendix B
We here present the proofs of the results of section 6.4.1.
Proof for case 1. The parallel condition is equivalent to dˆ0 = dˆ1 which implies that
L0+ = L1+, so that Eq. (14) becomes
PU =
1
2
+
1
4
(
~r + L0+ (~r) dˆ0
)
· (aˆ01 + aˆ11) .
This is maximized for ~r + L0+ (~r) dˆ0 =
aˆ01+aˆ
1
1
|aˆ01+aˆ11| , which implies that ~r
opt can be any vector of
the form specified in Eq. (15). ✷
Proof for case 2. Starting from Eq. (14) , we extremize PU with respect to variations
in ~r by setting δPU (~r) = 0. Using the fact that δr = δ
√
~r · ~r = δ~r · ~r/r, and
δLb+ (~r) = −
(
~r + Lb+ (~r) dˆb
~r · dˆb + Lb+ (~r)
)
· δ~r,
we find that the extremal ~r satisfy
1∑
b=0
(
aˆb1 −
(
dˆb · aˆb1
)( ~r + Lb+ (~r) dˆb
~r · dˆb + Lb+ (~r)
))
= 0. (B.1)
We now introduce the notation
x0 = ~r · dˆ⊥1 , x1 = ~r · dˆ⊥0 , x2 = ~r · nˆ, (B.2)
where dˆ⊥1 , dˆ
⊥
0 and nˆ are defined in Eq. (19). Making use of the fact that ~r =
(
~r · dˆ0
)
dˆ0 +(
~r · dˆ⊥0
)
dˆ⊥0 + (~r · nˆ) nˆ, we have
(
~r+L0+(~r)dˆ0
~r·dˆ0+L0+(~r)
)
= dˆ0 +
x1dˆ
⊥
0 +x2nˆ√
1−x2
1
−x2
2
, which together with aˆ01 =(
aˆ01 · dˆ0
)
dˆ0 +
(
aˆ01 · dˆ⊥0
)
dˆ⊥0 +
(
aˆ01 · nˆ
)
nˆ yields
aˆ01 −
(
dˆ0 · aˆ01
)( ~r + L0+ (~r) dˆ0
~r · dˆ0 + L0+ (~r)
)
=
(
aˆ01 · dˆ⊥0
)
dˆ⊥0 +
(
aˆ01 · nˆ
)
nˆ−
(
dˆ0 · aˆ01
)
√
1− x21 − x22
(
x1dˆ
⊥
0 + x2nˆ
)
.
An analogous result holds for b = 1. Plugging these expressions into Eq. (B.1) and taking the
dot product with each of dˆ0, dˆ1 and nˆ, we obtain the set of equations
0 =
(
aˆ11 · dˆ⊥1
)√
1− x20 − x22 −
(
aˆ11 · dˆ1
)
x0,
0 =
(
aˆ01 · dˆ⊥0
)√
1− x21 − x22 −
(
aˆ01 · dˆ0
)
x1,
0 =
((
aˆ01 + aˆ
1
1
) · nˆ)√1− x20 − x22√1− x21 − x22
−
(
aˆ01 · dˆ0
)√
1− x20 − x22x2 −
(
aˆ11 · dˆ1
)√
1− x21 − x22x2.
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The values of x0, x1 and x2 that maximize PU , denoted by x
max
0 , x
max
1 and x
max
2 , are easily
seen to be those given by Eq. (18). These define ~r max through Eq. (17).
If |~r max| ≤ 1, then it corresponds to the optimal density operator. If |~r max| > 1, then
there is no extremum of PU inside the Bloch ball and the optimal density operator must be
represented by a point on the boundary of the ball. Such a point corresponds to a pure state.
Consequently there is no freedom in the convex decomposition Alice realizes, and all that she
must decide is what state to tell Bob to test for. If she tells him
∣∣ψ0k〉 when she wishes to
unveil a bit value of 0 and
∣∣ψ1k′〉 when she wishes to unveil a bit value of 1, then in terms of
Bloch vectors, her probability of unveiling the bit of her choosing is
PU =
1
4
(
1 + rˆ · aˆ0k
)
+
1
4
(
1 + rˆ · aˆ1k′
)
=
1
2
+
1
4
rˆ · (aˆ0k + aˆ1k′) ,
where we write rˆ to emphasize that we are varying over pure density operators. The vector
rˆ =
aˆ0
k
+aˆ1
k′
|aˆ0k+aˆ1k′ | clearly maximizes PU . In our notational convention, aˆ
0
1 and aˆ
1
1 are the closest
pair of Bloch vectors from the two sets, so Alice should choose k = k′ = 1. It follows that the
optimal density operator is represented by the Bloch vector defined in Eq. (16).
Note that it may occur that aˆ02 and aˆ
1
2 are as close to one another as aˆ
0
1 and aˆ
1
1, that is, it
may occur that there is no unique ‘closest’ pair of Bloch vectors. However, in this case one
will not find |~r max| > 1. The reason is as follows. If one did find |~r max| > 1, then the optimal
~r would have to be a pure state. However, since the pure states associated with the Bloch
vectors
aˆ01+aˆ
1
1
|aˆ01+aˆ11| and
aˆ02+aˆ
1
2
|aˆ02+aˆ12| would yield the same PU , any mixture of these would also yield
this PU . This in turn would imply that there existed a solution with |~r max| < 1. ✷
Proof for case 2.1. Since aˆ01, aˆ
0
2, aˆ
1
1 and aˆ
1
2 all lie in a plane, aˆ
b
k · nˆ is independent of
b and k. In this case, we find xmax0 = aˆ
1
1 · dˆ⊥1 , xmax1 = aˆ01 · dˆ⊥0 and xmax2 = aˆ01 · nˆ. That this
corresponds to the point of intersection can be verified from the parametric equations for the
lines containing the two chords. ✷
Proof for case 2.2. If the chord defined by aˆb1 and aˆ
b
2 passes through the nˆ axis, then it
must lie in the plane of dˆb and nˆ, so that aˆ
b
k ·dˆ⊥b = 0. It follows that xmax0 = xmax1 = 0, and thus
~r max = xmax2 nˆ. Since |xmax2 | ≤ 1, we know that |~r max| ≤ 1, so that ~r opt = ~r max = xmax2 nˆ. ✷
Proof for case 2.3. The case being considered corresponds to nˆ · (aˆ0k + aˆ1k) = 0. We
must consider the two possibilities |~r max| ≤ 1 and |~r max| > 1. In the former, ~r opt = ~r max,
while in the latter ~r opt =
aˆ01+aˆ
1
1
|(aˆ01+aˆ11)| . Either way, the condition nˆ ·
(
aˆ0k + aˆ
1
k
)
= 0 implies that
~r opt · nˆ = 0. ✷
